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The rich nation is the novelty, and the development 
that makes entire nations rich is itself the pivotal 
development of modern history 
(Asa Briggs, British historian, 1963) 
Abstract 
The object of the paper is to place the present issues of world poverty, development, economic transition, 
and demographic change into proper historical perspective. The specificities of post-World War II 
developments are singled out, and the perspectives they offer for the history of modes of production and 
international relations highlighted. Some speculations concerning possible long run developments 
conclude the paper.  
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1. Introduction 
We live in a very unequal world plagued by poverty. Overall, economic progress 
is often perceived as too slow, as the advance of “globalization” renders the inequalities 
and miseries of the world less tolerable than in the past. However, if we look from the 
perspective of history, the present state of the world appears in a different light. A rather 
uncontroversial fact is that never in the history of the world have there been so many 
paupers as in the present times. But the reason for this is that there have never been so 
many people around. Indeed never in the history of the world has the percentage of 
poor people been so low. Economic inequality in the world has probably never been so 
high, but the reason is not, as sometimes hinted, that the lot of the poorer of the world 
has worsened, but the dramatic, albeit unequally distributed, economic improvement of 
the many. Indeed, never in the history of the world has economic and demographic 
growth been so rapid as after WWII. These are simple facts that can be easily appraised 
looking at available historical and contemporary statistics, but are not always adequately 
grasped while discussing the issues of world economic order, underdevelopment, and 
globalization. In particular, those who, without being able to sketch a plausible 
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alternative setup, would like to destroy the present economic order, because it is 
imperfect and unable to solve what may be perceived as basic ethical issues, are unable 
to appraise, in their Nirvana fallacy, the extent that the present world order has been, 
and continues to be, a powerful engine for engendering the economic progress of 
humanity as a whole.1 Post World War II economic progress has been greatly favoured 
by the absence of major wars,2 of the sort that were endemic in the past, and by the great 
increase of international exchanges, as well as by the acceleration of scientific and 
technological progress, helped by the increased role of the state in its organization and 
pursuit, partly motivated, especially in the USA, by the military needs of the cold war. 
The agricultural revolution and world economic progress have contributed to overcome 
decisively the Malthusian trap and bring about an impressive demographic explosion. 
Global overall peace can be attributed to the mutual threat of atomic destruction, and to 
a change of perspective in international relations against the respectability of wars of 
aggression and conquest, leading to a change in the rules of the game that was 
attempted, but practically failed, after the first World War. The price to pay has been that 
the world has lingered for almost half a century on the brink of a global nuclear 
catastrophe, as well as the freezing of frontiers and national aspirations. The price, ex 
post, has been worthwhile. The problem lies in the future. The main objective of the 
present paper is to give detailed quantitative substance to the previous assertions. We 
shall also speculate on alternative scenarios extrapolating future possible developments, 
and consequences of alternative policy courses.  
2. Poverty 
Historically world population has been increasing at a very slow pace, amounting 
to near stagnation, held in check by high mortality rates, especially of child mortality. Per 
capita incomes have been mostly at what we would regard utter poverty levels, and 
whenever they have increased they have done so at a very slow pace, amounting, in the 
long run, to some small fraction of one percent yearly. Following the industrial 
revolution things have started radically to change. But never have world population and 
world income increased so tumultuously as after the Second World War; indeed, the 
explosion both in wealth and population in this post-war period has been an historical 
unicum. Scientifically speaking, from the perspective of the history of mankind, the 
anomaly to be explained is not backwardness and poverty, but development and wealth. 
As we shall better see in what follows, the brakes that in the previous epochs constrained 
the growth of world population, and which started to slacken following the Industrial 
Revolution,3 have apparently been swept away by the progressive lengthening in life 
                                                 
1 As to the frailty of this engine in relation to fundamental disturbances that would put it into jeopardy, 
some forceful pages were written before the first World War by Norman Angell (1913, pp. 49 f.). The 
experience of the first World War and its aftermath provided a strong confirmation. 
2 This means all-out wars between major military powers. 
3 Or more exactly, following the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that has 
led first to the Industrial Revolution and, subsequently, through the medical and public hygiene 
innovations it was able to conjure, to the Mortality Revolution of the second half of the nineteenth 
century and later, coinciding with the times of what has been dubbed  the Second Industrial Revolution 
(cf. Easterlin, 1996, pp. 7-9, 23-29, 69 f.). 
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expectancy, leading to unprecedented demographic growth, which has been 
accompanied by unprecedented economic growth. 
Still, a large part of humanity lives in appalling poverty conditions. Indeed, there 
has never been such a high number of poor people in the world as in the post 
WWII period. If conventionally (very conventionally, indeed) we define, following the 
World Bank, as (absolute)4 poverty a daily consumption of less that two dollars,5 in 2001 
their number was estimated as 2.7 billion,6 more than the entire world population in 
1950.7 The number of extreme poor consuming less than one dollar a day in 2001 is 
reckoned to have been close to 1.1 billion, about the same as the entire world population 
in 1820 (which may be conventionally taken as the year of the coming of age of the 
Industrial Revolution in the UK and of its spreading outside); the number of the 
extreme poor in previous years is estimated to have been even higher, about 1.6 billion 
around 1980 (before the recent tumultuous growth of the economy of China). Most of 
them are concentrated in third world countries, but a few millions are living in (and a 
number of them leaving from) Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the so called transition 
countries).8 See the data in the following tables:9 
                                                 
4 Relative poverty depends on distribution. Then there is subjective poverty that depends on habits and 
aspirations, where the latter increase with the diffusion, facilitated by the means of mass communication, 
of the consumption models of the better off. We shall be concerned only cursory with these issues. 
5 Or rather 2.15 dollars a day at 1993 purchasing power (somewhat less than 800 dollars a year), 
corresponding to 2 dollars of 1985 international purchasing power. According to the World Bank 
definition 1.08 dollars of 1993 purchasing power a day (somewhat less than 400 dollars a year), 
corresponding to 1 dollar at 1985 international purchasing power, characterize extreme poverty. In the 
text we use the colloquially usual distinction of 1 and 2 dollars a day. (For the definition of the 
international poverty line see World Bank, 2005, table 2.5, “Poverty”, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm#definition; see also UNPD, 2007,  p. 367). 
6 Source: Word Bank (2005), table 2.5 “Poverty”, at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm. It should be noted that there has been actually a 
decrease (estimated at about 400 million) in the number of the extreme poor (less than 1$ a day) during 
the 20 years from 1981 to 2001, but only because of the reduction of extreme poverty in China, and 
some further decrease in the amount of the less extreme poor seems to be happening in the more recent 
years. For some recent discussion on world poverty estimates and some updating, see Chen and 
Ravaillon (2004) and (2007) and Ravaillon, Chen and Sangraula (2007). Taking into account the overall 
number of the world poor, one can appreciate the enormous migratory potential towards the more 
prosperous (or even the less poor) countries in a shrinking world, with potential far-reaching social and 
political consequences (for more on this point see Chilosi, 2002). Countries of emigration can at the 
same time become countries of immigration from even poorer countries, such as notably in the case of 
Eastern Europe as a whole, or parts of North Africa. (On South-South migrations see Hujo and Piper, 
2007.) 
7 See Table 1. 
8 The above data refer to Europe and Central Asia, but the poor in the area are essentially concentrated in 
the transition countries of Eastern Europe (including South-Eastern Europe) and of the former Soviet 
Union. 
9 The figures are expressed in  millions, the data are extracted from  World Bank, 2005, table 2.5. 
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Table 1. Number of people living with less than 2$ a day10 
Region 1981 2001 
East Asia & Pacific 1,170 864 
of which China 876 594 
Europe & Central Asia 20 93 (113 in 
1999) 
Latin America & Caribbean  99 128 
Middle East & North Africa 52 70 
South Asia 821 1,064 
Sub-Saharan Africa 288 516 
Total 2450 2735 
Excluding China 1,574 2,142 
 
Table 2. Number of people living with less than  1$ a day11 
Region 1981 2001 
East Asia & Pacific 796 271 
 China 634 212 
Europe & Central Asia 3 17(30 in 
1999) 
Latin America & Caribbean 36 50 
Middle East & North Africa 9 7 
South Asia 475 431 
Sub-Saharan Africa 164 313 
Total 1,482 1,089 
Excluding China 848 877 
 
It is notable that the number of the poor in transition countries as a whole has 
reached a peak in 1999, just a visible sign of the hardship engendered by the transition 
process during the nineties, but since then it has started to decrease. The same applies to 
the percentage of the poor in the population, increasing, according to World Bank data, 
from 0.4 in 1987 to a peak of 6.3 in 1999, decreasing to 3.6 in 2001 (for those living with 
less than 1$ a day); increasing from 3.3 in 1987 to a peak of 23.8 in 1999, decreasing to 
19.7 in 2001 (for those living with less than 2$ a day).12 
                                                 
10 Source: Word Bank (2005), table 2.5 “Poverty”, at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm. 
11 Source: ibidem. 
12 Source of the data in following table: ibidem. 
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Table 3. Percentage of the poor in Eastern Europe (in 2002) 
 Below1$ 
a day 
Below 
2$ a day 
Albania <2 11.8 
Belarus <2 <2 
Bosnia nd nd 
Bulgaria 4.7 16.2 
Croatia <2 <2 
Cz. Rep. <2 <2 
Estonia <2 5.2 
Hungary <2 <2 
Latvia <2 8.3 
Lithuania <2 6.9 
Macedonia <2 4 
Moldova 22 63.7 
Poland <2 <2 
Romania <2 14 
Russia <2 7.5 
Ser. Mon. nd nd 
Slovenia <2 <2 
Slovakia <2 2.9 
Ukraine 2.9 45.7 
 
3. The world poor as a percentage 
But on the whole the share of the poor in the human population has never been 
so low.13 
According to the historical estimates reported in Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002, pp. 731-732), and taking into account the number of conventional poor people in 
2001, estimated by the World Bank, as well as the estimate of the size of world 
population in 2001, reported in table 4, the share of world population living in poverty 
diminishes from 94,4% in 1820 to 44% in 2001, that of those living in extreme poverty 
from 83,9 in 1820 down to 18% in 2001. In the end, taking into account the fact that in 
the period the share of the poor has been greatly reduced, the fundamental explanation 
of why there are so many poor people in the world is that there are so many people 
around. Human population has increased steadily and dramatically in the last two 
centuries, and in particular in the last few decades. Some relevant data are reported in 
table 4. 
                                                 
13 Of course this depends crucially on the definition of poor. Here we use the World Bank definition, 
whereby the poor are defined in terms of absolute purchasing power. This may not well correspond to a 
subjective, socially and environmentally conditioned, definition of poverty, in the sense of deprivation 
(see on this point, in particular, Kenny, 2006). Subjective deprivation may be a function of achieved 
living standards, and increasing expectations (cf. Easterlin, 1996, pp. 131-144). All this is perfectly true, 
but without a common measure one could hardly make intertemporal comparisons. Of course, in 
making the latter one should ideally go into detail as to the specific relevant circumstances of the various 
cases (possibly extending the narrative to the whole range of Sen’s capabilities). Here we may be content 
to note that the trends in average incomes are corroborated by comparable trends in life statistics (see 
below). 
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Table 414 Human population in the course of history (in millions) 15 
8000 BC 5  
1000 BC 50  
500 BC 100  
1 AD 231  
1000  268  
1500 438  
1600 556  
1700 603  
1750  790  
1800 980  
1820 1,041 
1870 1,271 
1913 1,791  
1950 2,535  
1960 3,032  
1970 3,699  
1980 4,451  
1990 5,295 
1995 5,719  
2001 6,148 
2005 6, 515  
2008 6,641, the 1/1/2008, as projected according to the World population clock 
To grasp the extent of the dramatic acceleration of population growth in recent 
times one may notice that the increase in population in the ten years between 1995 and 
2005 (796 million) is more or less the same as that in the 10,000 years or so from the 
                                                 
14 The sources of the data are as follows: 8000 BC, Haub, 1995, p. 5, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 
1000 and 500 BC, McEvedy and Jones, 1978, pp. 342-351, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 1-1700 
and 1820-1913, Maddison (2006), p. 636; 1750 and 1800, United Nations, 1999; 1950-2005, United 
Nations, 2006, with the exception of 2001, taken from US Census Bureau 2007b. The data from 1800 in 
Europe and from 1900 in the other continents are regarded, by and large, to have a fair degree of 
reliability. The data concerning the previous years are just estimates or, even, more or less wild guesses. 
They should be considered to give an order of magnitude, rather than provide reliable data with any 
degree of precision (on this see Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2002). Indeed, this applies even more to the 
estimates concerning national income in the tables that follow.  
15 Looking at the first lines of the table, comparing them with the last ones, one is forced to come to terms 
with the fact that the momentous historical events of our distant past, recollected and magnified in 
history books, involved such comparatively insignificant numbers of people.  
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start of the agricultural revolution to the dawn of the industrial revolution (for which we 
may conventionally the take year 1750). 
If we concentrate our attention to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
in the periodization of table 6 below, we can see that the highest rate of population 
growth in history has taken place in the years 1950-73, slightly less but still remarkable 
was the rate of growth of population in 1870-1913, while the low rates in the period 
1914-1950 were certainly due to the impact of two world wars and of their aftermath. 
The negative rate of growth in the latest period can be fairly attributed to the social and 
economic disruptions following the fall of the communist regimes. 
3. An unequal world 
While a considerable share of the world population still lives in poverty, world 
income and wealth are very unequally distributed. A recent research by Wider, the ONU 
economic research centre on poverty and development16 (Davis et alii, 2006a), shows the 
extent of world inequality in the distribution of personal wealth: 17  
The 24 richer OECD countries own 83% of world private wealth (64% at PPP$) 
with only 15% of world population and a per capita wealth of $116,000 (114,000 at 
PPP$). The 64 poorest countries with 40% of world population own 2% of world 
personal wealth (8% at PPP$), with a per capita wealth of 1000$ (5000 at PPP$)18 
In 2000 the 1% richest adults owned the 40% of overall private wealth (32% in  
PPP$ terms)19; the richest 10%, 85%; the poorest 50%, 1% (4% in PPP$ terms).20 
The Gini index of inequality of overall world wealth distribution (calculated using 
current exchange rates) is given as 89 (80 in PPP$ terms)21, the same as that of a group 
of 10, where 1 has 1000, and 9, 1 each.22 
                                                 
16 World Institute for Development Economics Research: http://www.wider.unu.edu. 
17 Where personal wealth is defined as “the value of physical and financial assets less liabilities” (Davies et 
alii, 2006a, p. 1). The data refer to the year 2000. Methodology: “average wealth level: based on 
household balance sheets and wealth survey data for 38 countries (56% of the world population and 
80% of wealth) extended by regression methods to most other countries region--income class averages 
imputed to remaining countries…distribution of wealth: based on distribution data for 20 countries 
wealth concentration estimated from income distribution for most other countries region--income class 
averages imputed to remaining countries” (Davies et alii, 2006b). The data considered refer to the year 
2000, and are either measured in dollar terms at the current exchange rates or in Purchasing Power Parity 
dollars (PPP$; this means that all values are converted in dollars using exchange rates such that the 
purchasing power of the dollar will be more or less the same once transformed in the various world 
currencies). It must be noted that passing from current dollars to PPP$ reduces somewhat world 
inequality, since the dollar purchasing power is usually higher in poorer countries, but it does not alter 
substantially the global picture. It should be noted that an inquiry such as the one referred to above is 
based on limited data and fraught with methodological difficulties; therefore one should stress that, as is 
always the case with statistics, but much more in the present instance, the data should be considered to 
give some order of magnitude rather than be taken at face value. For a detailed explanation of the 
methods used in the inquiry one may refer to the above source. 
18 Ibidem, Table 8. 
19 “37% reside in the US, 27% in Japan” (Davies et alii, 2006b). 
20 Davies et alii, 2006a, Table 10, and Table 11a. 
21 Ibidem, Table 12. If the exchange rates are calculated according to Purchasing Power Parity the 
inequality is somewhat lower since the purchasing power in the poorer countries is revalued, but the 
overall picture does not change. 
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Income is distributed less unequally than wealth, but still in a markedly unequal 
way. According to most estimates, reported in Milanovic (2006, p. 8), the Gini 
coefficient of world income distribution is around 65% in the contemporary world.23 To 
make a comparison, the Gini index of the distribution of family incomes of Italy is 
reported as 36, that of the USA 45, that of Sweden 25. 24 The state where the Gini index 
appears to be highest, among those reported in CIA’s World Factbook, is Namibia with 
71, but probably only because in other, even more unequal, third world countries no 
statistical data allowing its calculation are available. 25 
Table 5. Poverty and income distribution in recent world history26 
year Gini coefficient of world income distribution
Percentage of the population living in 
poverty 
Percentage of the population living in extreme poverty 
1820 0.500 94.4 83.9 
1850 0.532 92.5 81.5 
1870 0.560 89.6 75.4 
1890 0.588 85.7 71.7 
1910 0.610 82.4 65.6 
1929 0.616 75.9 56.3 
1950 0.640 71.9 54.8 
1960 0.635 64.3 44 
1970 0.650 60.1 35.6 
1980 0.657 55 31.5 
1992 0.657 51.3 23.7 
2001 0.657 
(0.699)27 
44 18 
                                                                                                                                           
22 Davies et alii, 2006b, p. 9. 
23 The paper by Milanovic contains an interesting critical review of the different methodological 
approaches used to get those values. From the historical viewpoint it is believed that in the past  income 
differences inside nations were relatively more relevant than nowadays in the determination of global 
inequality. In the pre-industrial world more than half of global income inequality could have been due to 
inequality in income distribution inside nations, while today the prevailing component, about 70%, is 
deemed to be due to differences in average per-capita incomes between nations (Milanovic, 2006, p. 9; 
on the other hand in more recent times, in the eighties and nineties, the weight of the inside nations 
component seems to have somewhat increased: cf. Nell, 2006, p. 697). According to the data reported in 
Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731) there has been an increase through time in the world Gini 
coefficient, from 0,50 in 1820 up to the present values (see table 5). But values for so far away periods 
seem to be rather speculative estimates, even more daring than the speculative estimates needed to arrive 
at an aggregate measure for the contemporary world as a whole.  
24 The Gini coefficients above are taken from CIA (2007). 
25 Such as Equatorial Guinea that, according to CIA (2007), has the “fourth highest per capita income in 
the world” but where the great bulk of the population allegedly lives in desperate conditions with less 
than a dollar a day (cf. also “Playboy waits for his African throne “, Sunday Times, 3/9/2006, available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article626511.ece). 
26 Data taken from Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731); the data of the last row are calculated from 
population data in table 4 and Word Bank poverty data. 
27 Calculation from 2002 Word Income Distribution Database in Milanovic (28/12/2007). The figure 
between brackets refer to a recently revised set of PPP$ exchange rates (ibidem). 
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4. What is the source of the present high inequalities and what can we do 
about it 
4.1 Poverty, inequality, and maximum potential inequality 
According to the previous table, while world inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, has steadily increased since 1820, the proportion of paupers in the world has 
steadily decreased. In more recent times the inequality of income distribution inside 
nations seems on average to have somewhat increased, but the trend is not uniform in 
the different regions of the world.28 At the same time the changes in the overall world 
Gini coefficient of the present in relation to the more recent past are of a quite different 
order of magnitude as compared to the dramatic increase in per capita incomes. This 
signifies that the rate of surplus extraction (“the inequality extraction ratio”) has 
dramatically decreased, where the inequality extraction ratio is defined as the share of 
maximum potential inequality reached by actual inequality, given the relative size of the 
elite (where the actual size of the elite appears to have relatively minor practical 
importance in the determination of the Gini coefficient).29 In this perspective, the 
maximum of potential inequality depends on average income and subsistence income: if 
the incomes of the masses are maintained at physical subsistence level the surplus that is 
left corresponds to the rate of maximum potential extraction. The higher per capita 
income, the higher is the extent of maximum potential extraction. If the degree of 
statistical inequality is constant, an increase in average income translates into a lower rate 
of extraction, revealing a lower degree in the actual pursuit of inequality. This indeed is 
what has historically happened: the overall extraction rate has steadily decreased, a trend 
which could have been a consequence of the changed nature of political and economic 
institutions and of greater economic and social complexity.30 In the end, seen in an 
historical context, the extent of present inequality appears not to depend on the paupers 
of the world being worse off, since an increasing proportion of the worse off are lifted 
from their state of absolute poverty, but on the fact that on the whole the lot of humans 
has dramatically, albeit unequally, improved.31 To some extent inequality may be a 
consequence of the rules of economic organization that allow the attainment of the 
given level of production (as argued, with some exaggeration, by Marx, 1875: “any 
distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the 
distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The latter distribution, 
however, is a feature of the mode of production itself”). Thus it is conceivable that 
under real circumstances inequality could not be reduced below some level (such as 
operationally measured by Gini coefficient) without bringing about a reduction of 
                                                 
28 See IMF (2007a, pp. 138 f.). 
29 Cf. Milanovic et alii, 2007, pp. 9-10. 
30 See Milanovic et alii (2007). An instance of a recent reverse trend towards an increase in the rate of 
surplus extraction could have been the steep increase of chief executives compensations in some 
advanced economies, which may amount to a sort of surplus extraction engineered by collusive 
behaviour.  
31 As Milanovic (2004, p. 24) puts it: “Average income levels also set an upper boundary on inequality. … 
As societies develop, income inequality has the ‘space’ to grow simply because there is a surplus which 
can be appropriated or redistributed among members of the society.” 
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income produced. It is also true that too much inequality could have a negative impact 
on income.32 One could then modify the concept of extraction rate as referring to the 
additional inequality above the minimum level compatible with the production of at least 
the given per capita income. (Operationally one could, for instance, take as an upper 
bound to the minimum amount of inequality compatible with the production of the 
given per capita income, the minimum inequality presented by comparable economies 
having similar levels of per capita income.) The above modification would strengthen 
the conclusion that overall the rate of surplus extraction is lower nowadays than in the 
past.33  
As a consequence of the unprecedented economic progress and of the diffusion of 
medical and hygiene innovations from the West to the Rest of the world, the rate of growth 
of world population has never been so high as after WWII (see Table 6). Among the 
regions of the world the highest growth rate has been that of Africa, the poorest region 
with the least economic growth.34 From this it is immediately evident that the strongest 
factor explaining the demographic explosion is the diffusion of medical innovations rather 
than economic growth per se.35 The population explosion, together with the composite 
ethnic structure of the artificial political divisions left over from colonial times, replicated 
in the post-colonial state boundaries,36 and the low educational attainments, contribute 
to explain the tensions and bloody conflicts that have engulfed that unfortunate 
continent.37 
4.2 What can be done 
As to the concretely implementable measures for bringing about a more equal 
distribution, without affecting the unique engine of growth and welfare that has been 
                                                 
32 Cf. Milanovic et al. (2007, pp. 29-30): “More political power and patronage implies more inequality. The 
frequent claim that inequality promotes accumulation and growth does not get much support from 
history. On the contrary, great economic inequality has always been correlated with extreme 
concentration of political power, and that power has always been used to widen the income gaps 
through rent-seeking and rent-keeping, forces that demonstrably retard economic growth.”  
33 Obviously one thing is inequality of incomes, another inequality of welfare. The latter is a very elusive 
concept, but it is what really matters. The first is at best a proxy. In considering how does income 
inequality translate into inequality in welfare it seems reasonable to assume decreasing utility of income, 
appraised for instance through “extended sympathy” (putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes). And 
this too could strengthen the conclusion that overall the rate of surplus extraction (this time in welfare 
terms) has become lower.  
34 The extreme poverty rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is 41% (IMF October 2007b, p. 20). On the whole the 
post-independence economic performance of African countries (with some exceptions, notably 
Botswana) has been dismal: “on average, over the period 1960–2000 Africa’s population-weighted per 
capita annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) was a mere 0.1%” (Collier, 2007a, p. 16763). But 
African economic performance has much improved since the late nineties (cf. IMF, 2007a pp. 9, f.; IMF, 
2007b); in Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, per capita growth runs at about 3% a year, not a bad 
performance considering the very high population growth rate (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). 
35 A reductionist stance on the impact of economic growth on the Mortality Revolution, and hence on 
demographic growth (before fertility controls step in) is taken by Easterly (1996, pp. 69-93). 
36 This does not mean that “natural” state boundaries would have existed anyway, given the patchwork 
distribution of ethnicities in the African continent. 
37 For a recent in-depth assessment of Africa’s economic predicaments see Collier, 2007a, and more 
amply, Collier 2007b. 
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running in the last sixty years or so of world history, there is no much clarity of thought. 
As is often the case, what appears at first sight, is not what really is, if one looks 
rationally at the implications.  
4.2.1 Globalization, poverty and distribution 
For instance the various proposals for limiting the extent of the liberalization of 
the world market, such as advocated by the various anti-WTO and trade-unions inspired 
movements, would probably hamper a main source of growth and economic 
improvement of the enterprising poor. 38 Indeed, it appears that for reducing the plight 
of the poor more globalization is needed, not less.39 Globalization improves the welfare 
of the worse off essentially because it is conducive to greater growth40 that spills over to 
the very poor.41 However not necessarily globalization and growth, considering also the 
impact of technical progress, lead to an improvement of the worse off in relative terms42 
and inequality increases could contribute to offset the positive impact on welfare of the 
increases in real incomes.43 As to the trend in income distribution, apparently the main 
culprit of recent increases in economic inequality in some areas of the planet seems to 
have been technological progress, by demanding skills and qualifications and substituting 
less skilled labour.44 On the other hand economic “globalization” (in the sense of 
                                                 
38 For the negative overall impact of protectionism on growth, see the quantitative inquiry in Milanovic 
(2005). Cf. also IMF (2007a, p. 157) for the favourable impact of international trade on the relative 
position of the lower quintiles. 
39 For data on trade and financial globalization accompanying the high growth performance of developing 
economies in more recent times, especially since the nineties, see IMF (2007a, pp. 135-139). Trade 
globalization can be measured in terms of the increasing ratio of imports and exports to GNP, financial 
globalization as cross-border assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. Of course globalization is more than 
that, and includes globalization in technical knowledge, information, travel and contacts across countries, 
regions and continents. Technical progresses in communications and transportation, together with 
international trade and financial liberalization, have much contributed to all aspects of globalization.  
40 On the role of international trade and openness in conjuring development and economic progress see Dollar 
and Kray (2004) and the literature referred there. For a contrary, if rather unbalanced, view, see Milanovic 
(2003). 
41 “Evidence suggests that better growth is translating into declining poverty levels… for a sample of 19 
low income countries, 1 percent of GDP growth was associated with a 1.3 percent fall in the rate of 
extreme poverty and a 0.9 percent fall in the $2-a-day poverty rate” (World Bank (2007, p. 3). “Across all 
regions, the evidence therefore suggests that in an absolute sense the poor are no worse off (except in a 
few post-crisis economies), and in most cases significantly better off, during the most recent phase of 
globalization … over the past two decades, income growth has been positive for all quintiles in virtually 
all regions and all income groups during the recent period of globalization” (IMF, October 2007a, p. 
141). 
42 Whether globalization leads to a reduction or to an increase in inequality is a contentious issue. See on 
this point Milanovic (2006) and the literature quoted by him. 
43 Milanovic, 2006, p. 13: “the process of globalization by itself changes the perception of one’s position, 
and even if globalization may raise everybody’s real income, it could exacerbate, rather than moderate, 
feelings of despondency and deprivation among the poor.” This could contribute to create the 
motivation for migrating towards more affluent countries, while increasing incomes can supply the 
resources for meeting the costs of migration, often a costly business in relation to the scant resources of 
the poorest of the earth.  
44 Cf. IMF (2007a, pp. 139-141). 
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increase of trade and financial flows,45 with the first having an overall equalizing, the 
second a disequalizing effect) appears to have had a different impact in the different 
areas of the world. According to IMF (2007a) economic globalization is seen to increase 
inequality somewhat in developed countries (because of the prevailing impact of 
financial liberalization, while trade liberalization is seen to exert an equalizing impact 
anyway46) and decrease inequality in the less developed ones (because of the prevailing 
impact of trade liberalization).47 At the same time the diffusion of technological advances 
all over the world is obviously itself a manifestation of “globalization” and could hardly 
be isolated from the other intervening factors (such as for instance financial 
liberalization, since foreign direct investment in particular constitutes an essential vehicle 
for international technological transfers).  
4.2.2 Aid and transfers 
As to transfers, it is hardly possible that transfers of the size needed to really 
bring about a significant reduction of world inequality in per capita income and wealth 
could be acceptable to the public opinions of better off countries;48 in general, the 
propensity to aid the poor of the world is quite widespread, especially in the 
“development buzz … generated by rock stars, celebrities and NGOs”49, but with 
somebody else’s money and resources.50 Moreover there is the issue of the lasting effects 
                                                 
45 This corresponds to the World Bank’s narrow definition of globalization as the “freedom and ability of 
individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries".(cf. 
Milanovic, 2002, p. 3). 
46 This appears to be contrary to what is implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but it may be 
explained by the reduction in the price of basic wage goods imported from developing countries, in 
particular, and by the reduction in the relative importance of worse paid manufacturing jobs (ibidem pp. 
155-156). As to the impact of financial liberalization in increasing inequalities both in developed and in 
underdeveloped countries this is attributed to the fact that “higher FDI inflows have increased the 
demand for skilled labor, whereas outward FDI in advanced economies has reduced the demand for 
relatively lower-skilled workers in these countries” (ibidem, p. 159). 
47 Cf. IMF, 2007a, ch. 4, pp. 135-170.  
48 The schemes that have been proposed in regard, reviewed by Milanovic (November 2007), seem utterly 
unrealistic. 
49 Collier, 2007b, p.4. 
50 Such as in the movement for international debt relief, where the proponents do not appreciate that the 
only radical way to suppress debt is to suppress credit, while insolvency makes international debt more 
risky, and therefore more onerous, and this not necessarily is in the interest of poorer countries. None of 
the vocal members of the debt remission campaign seems to have started an international voluntary 
subscription for paying off poorer countries’ debt by reimbursing the creditors, thus presumably 
eliminating, or reducing, the debt without worsening the credit rating of poorer debtors. None of the 
many who deem just and natural that the pharmaceutical industry renounce exploiting the intellectual 
property of drugs against Aids, meritoriously discovered at the cost of huge investments, propose to 
start a collection for purchasing their patents at market value in order to make them free for mankind, 
and in particular for the poorest and most affected by the disease section of world population, such as in 
Africa. As a prominent historical representative of the “else’s money handouts” school we may mention 
Jeffrey Sachs. For a comprehensive criticism of past experience of aid and its bureaucratic 
implementation see Easterly (2006). For a hefty criticism of Easterly’s standpoint, and Easterly’s reply, 
see Sachs (2006) and Easterly (n.d). To some extent the whole issue boils down whether the cup of 
western assistance is, or was, half full or half empty, one third full or one third empty. 
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of the culture of dependency in perpetuating the poverty trap, by facilitating the survival 
of corrupt and inefficient governments, and the old maxim that international aid 
amounts to taking away from the poor of the donor countries for giving to the rich of 
the receiving countries, which, in its apparent paradox, may capture a relevant aspect of 
international aid.51 What is sometimes overlooked is that aid usually does not directly 
transfer resources to the poor of the world, since governments act as representatives of 
the inhabitants of a country, and governments in poorer countries are often very corrupt 
and inefficient.52 There is the damaging possibility that aid be simply wasted away and 
siphoned off by corrupt regimes, or, even worse, spent in armament feeding third world 
wars.53 Aid, analogously to natural resources windfalls, weakens the determination to 
reform and to combat corruption and may hamper growth through the so-called Dutch 
disease, by increasing prices and wage costs.54 Of course theoretically speaking aid could 
aid reform and better governance through ex-ante conditionality, but, besides being 
strongly resented as a violation of sovereignty, and sometimes as a plot of richer 
countries to the detriment of aid receivers, ex-ante conditionality apparently does not 
work in practice, at least with respect to the poorer countries with worse governance.55 
As to changing the basis of the international economic order from free exchange 
and market to planned allocation and material barters, even aside from the concrete issue 
of its (in)feasibility, the Comecon experience of planned material exchanges is not really 
enticing; the same applies to the other historical instances where barter exchange 
prevailed, with consequent high transaction costs and highly reduced gains from trading. 
To some extent distribution is internationally, as well as inside nations, a consequence of 
the institutions that regulate and, directly or indirectly, affect production and exchange. 
The institutions that may favour high levels of productivity and growth (such as the 
remarkable performance of the developing countries, aside from the unfortunate 
“bottom billion”, reaching in the last two decades of the century the unprecedented rate 
of 4 per cent per capita, and even more in the first years of the new millennium)56 have 
some distributional consequences that only partially can be mitigated without affecting 
                                                 
51 For a discussion of this issue and of the way to overcome it see Milanovic (October 2007). To his plea 
for taking into account, in directing aid, the degree in inequality of income distribution in the receiving 
countries, “penalizing countries with highly unequal distribution” one may add that the degree of 
inequality may be seen as an indicator of the extraction power of the elite in a receiving country, and of 
its power to appropriate the advantages of transfers, increasing the probability of the latter acting 
regressively. 
52 An extreme case is mentioned by Collier (2007b, p. 66): only 1% of the funds spent by the Government 
of Chad for financing rural health clinics actually reached them. Another less extreme case relates to 
Uganda, where “only around 20 percent of the money that the Ministry of Finance released for primary 
schools, other than for teachers’ salaries, actually reached the schools” (p. 150). 
53 According to Collier (2007b, p. 103) “something around 40 percent of Africa’s military spending is 
inadvertently financed by aid”.  
54 Collier, 2007b, pp. 40 f. According to Collier (ibidem, p. 102) “large inflows of money without any 
restrictions do not seem to be well spent in many of the countries of the bottom billion.” 
55 Ibidem, pp. 109-110. For a consideration how aid could be tailored to really help the development of  
“the bottom million”, see chapter 7, pp. 99-123. 
56 Collier, 2007b, p. 8. This finds a counterpart in the transformation of trade and the economic basis, 
whereby actually “80 percent of developing countries exports are manufactures, and service exports are 
also mushrooming.” (Ibidem, p. 81.) 
 - 14 -
economic outcomes. Thus to radically change those institutions could be against the 
interest of the world poor, despite the deep injustice of a world where at least 60% of 
one’s position in the global personal income distribution can be explained by the 
accident of being born in a country instead than somewhere else, and a good deal of the 
rest by the accident of having being born in a family rather than in another.57 In reality 
the greatest practical opportunities for redistribution lie inside countries through the 
shaping of their institutions and the control of the political process. In lower and middle 
income countries, with good natural resource endowments in particular, the specific 
extractive nature of the institutions, enhanced by the absence of checks and balances, 
often leads to the formation of high incomes based on rents, whereby the resulting high 
degree of inequality (at about 40 Gini coefficient and above) represents a brake to 
growth rather than a by-product of growth-enhancing institutions and processes, 58 not 
to speak about the much higher risk of civil war associated with “dependence upon 
primary commodity exports”.59 
The most radical way to overcome this issue would be the cosmopolitan one to 
make of the world a single country, with the power and responsibility to decide and 
enact redistribution policies. One could only (idly) speculate about the kind of 
institutions and economic governance such a cosmopolitan world would have; not 
necessarily the best ones, owing to the actual composition of its citizenship. But for 
good or for worse humanity is divided into separate territorial states and solidarity 
towards the citizens of other states is much lesser than solidarity towards fellow citizens, 
or even more, wherever there are strong ethnic divisions inside states, towards one’s 
own ethnic community. Moreover measures of solidarity are also the outcome of the fact 
that citizens, however destitute, are partaking into, and therefore have some scope for, 
influencing through collective action the political process, albeit with quite different 
degrees, according to its specific characteristics. Thus “the state is, for the time being, 
the only legitimate context within which relative deprivation can be addressed through 
redistributive policies and practices”, and “it is at the level of states only that the 
principles of distributive justice can and may apply, as it is on this level alone that we 
have the institutional means to legitimately take from the rich and give to the poor”. For 
good or for worse, people will belong to separate states for a long time to come, rather 
than being simply citizens of the world, and this will limit the degree of solidarity and 
redistribution at the world level.60  
A related problem to which no easy solution can be seen is that of the so-called 
fragile states, “countries with particularly weak governance, institutions, and 
                                                 
57 See Milanovic (2008).  
58 See Nell (2006), pp. 697-698 and the literature quoted there. 
59 Collier 2007b, p. 21. According to Collier some international charter agreed among all main industrial 
partners requiring  greater transparency in the conditions of the exploitation of natural resources and the 
utilization of the rents thereof would be of great help in improving the way in which those revenues are 
spent. To the obvious objection that China’s unconditional scrambling for the underdeveloped world’s 
natural resources would break any conceivable charter, Collier’s rather unpersuasive counterargument is 
that “The West has to offer China greater inclusion in power in return for adherence to international 
standards.” (Ibidem, p. 146.) 
60 Cf. Neal, 2006, pp.702-703. 
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capacity…often in conflict”61 (where either internal or external conflicts are often at the 
origin of “fragility”) that did not take advantage of recent world economic growth, and 
are plagued by particularly high problems of extreme poverty, high child mortality, and 
illiteracy. Short of neo-colonialist endeavours, which could hardly be a choice, the only 
way seems to hope that, favoured by the impact of globalization and institutional 
imitation, and possibly through the help of the international community, their internal 
dynamics could evolve so as to bring about a more favourable environment, in particular 
through the overcoming of the violent conflicts often at the origin of “fragility”. Indeed, 
a greater participation in peace keeping by the international community in order to 
reduce the probability to conflict reversion could be the best form of aid. 62 As to peace 
enforcing, and nation and institution building, this is a much more tricky issue, because 
of its neo-colonialist connotations and implied violation of national sovereignty, lack of 
consensus by the international community, and lack of volunteers to offer the needed 
resources and face the inevitable losses and expenditures. One may just be left with the 
solution to leave fragile states to do their own experiences, as everybody else has done in 
the past, and learn through generations how to progress, forming and changing their 
own institutions. But our world has become much more impatient with historical time, 
and a country’s internal disturbances may severely impact on their neighbours, not only 
as a consequence of the collapse of trade following the collapse of the economy, but 
particularly by originating massive sudden emigrations, and the spreading abroad of 
internal disturbances, as well as diseases.63 We may just remind the disastrous 
consequences of Ruanda’s internal conflicts on Congo/Zaire or, quite recently, of 
Mugabe’s follies for the internal peace of South Africa. The consequences of failed states 
can be indeed very severe, even if only the economically measurable aspects are taken 
into consideration.64 
5. Soul-searching and self-bashing 
How much are the plight of poorer countries and the affluence of richer ones 
due to colonialism? And how much is the misery of Africa in particular a consequence of 
the transatlantic slave trade? How much does the responsibility of the latter fall on 
European shoulders? Branko Milanovic has recently produced an interesting inquiry into 
the first issue (Milanovic, 2005). According to his quantitative analysis on a large 
historical statistical data base, colonialism has not appreciably helped nor damaged on 
balance the economic development either of colonial powers or of colonies.65 One may 
                                                 
61 World Bank (2007, pp. 2-3). 
62 As advocated notably by Paul Collier. 
63 Cf. Collier, 2007b, p. 31. 
64 According to a rough estimate by Collier (2007b, p.103) the “costs of a typical civil war” are around $ 64 
billion. 
65 This is consistent with the fact that “colonies accounted for only a minor share of the trade and 
investment of developed countries in the nineteenth century, and most of the greatly expanded world 
trade and investment was carried on within the developed bloc itself” (Easterlin, 1996, p 2). “In the half 
century before World War I the market for developed countries’ exports were chiefly in other developed  
countries, and the principal suppliers of primary products requirements of the developed countries were 
other developed countries…Considering Great Britain, France, and Germany together, on the eve of 
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add that however repulsive for our modern sensibility is the imperialist idea to conquer a 
militarily weaker country and rule it by force in the interest of the conqueror, the 
countries that were conquered and subjected were not usually peaceful prosperous 
heavens. By and large the West and the Rest were players of the same historical game, of 
violent territorial expansion and domination, war, plunder, and conquest, that only quite 
recently has been relinquished and declared illegal by most part of humanity (see 
below).66 In the history of humanity evil has always been banal, or, even more, evil (what 
we moderns consider evil) was often not seen as such, or was simply cloaked under false 
pretensions.67 As is often the case in what we may see as the progress of the moral 
awareness of humanity, some activities that in an epoch are considered as legitimate, 
come up to be subsequently perceived as crimes. The history of mankind is a dense 
collection of actions of the kind that nowadays are defined as crimes against humanity, 
and even in sacred books genocides can be extolled as acts of pious obedience to God.68 
Moreover, while considering the overall impact of the West on the Rest, one cannot 
separate the negative aspects of its interrelation from the positive impact that the 
diffusion of western technological advances has had on the demographic and economic 
expansion of the Rest as a whole. Let us turn now to the specific responsibility of the 
West on slavery. Slavery has been practiced by humanity from time immemorial, and 
probably very few parts of the earth have been immune. Africa has certainly been no 
exception.69 Trans-Saharan slave trade in particular was practised to a large scale before 
the encroachment of the Europeans, but also slave trade towards Asia was substantial.70 
With the advantage of European technology and organization, and pulled by the demand 
of the new plantation economies of the New World, slave trade reached from the 
sixteenth century onward unheard of dimensions. But in partaking blames and 
responsibilities one should consider that European traders were taking care of transport 
and marketing, while the actual production of slaves was the domain of the Africans 
themselves and, even before the transatlantic trade, the capture and trade of slaves was 
one of the main economic activities of Sub-Saharan Africa. If to the demerit and shame 
of the Europeans should be ascribed the massive extent of the transatlantic trade, to 
their merit and honour it must be attributed having made slave trade and slavery illegal, 
extending the prohibition of slavery to their colonial domains, thus bringing to an end a 
time immemorial historical tradition of slavery and slave trade. 71 
 
                                                                                                                                           
World War II their own Third World colonies accounted for only 11 percent of their merchandise trade 
and 12 percent of their foreign investment” (p. 43). 
66 For an outline of the history of African autochthonous kingdoms and empires and of their wars, see 
Collins and Burns (2007). 
67 Such as saving through conversion the souls of the infidels, as in the 1455 Papal Bull Romanus Pontifex, 
legitimizing the slave trade (Maddison, 2006, p 60), or King Leopold’s pretension to administer Congo 
for exclusive humanitarian purposes.  
68 Such as the story of Saul and the Amalekites in the Bible. 
69 The oldest documentation of slavery in Africa dates back to 2900 BC (Collins and Burns, p. 202).  
70 Cf. Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 202-247; Maddison, 2006, pp. 574-575. Hellie, 2007. 
71 Notable were in particular the British 1807 “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade" and 1833 “Slavery 
Abolition Act”. For a more comprehensive picture see Wikipedia’s entry “Abolition of Slavery Timeline”. 
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Table 6. Yearly average rates of population growth 1-200772 (in percentages) 
 1-1000 
1000-
1500 
1500-
1820 
1820-
1870 
1870-
1913 
1913-
1950 
1950-
1973 
1973-
2001 
2001-
2007 
Western 
Europe 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.69 0.77 0.42 0.71 0.32 0.26 
Eastern 
Europe 0.03 0.15 0.31 0.77 0.92 0.26 1.01 0.32 -0.03 
Former USSR 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.97 1.33 0.38 1.44 0.54 -0.15 
Western 
offshoots73 0.05 0.07 0.44 2.86 2.07 1.25 1.54 1.09 0.94 
Latin America 0.07 0.09 0.07 1.25 1.63 1.96 2.73 1.96 1.3 
Japan 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.95 1.32 1.14 0.55 0.06 
Total Asia 
excl. Japan 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.55 0.92 2.19 1.80 1.29 
Africa 0.07 0.07 0.1574 0.40 0.75 1.64 2.37 2.69 2.36 
World 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.93 1.93 1.62 1.20 
6. The population explosion 
In a secular (or rather millennial) perspective, before the Industrial Revolution 
population growth was held in check by high mortality rates, accompanied by high birth 
rates. The source of high mortality rates in a classical Malthusian perspective could have 
been the limitation in the amount of available agricultural resources, either continuously, 
leading to poor nutrition (and therefore to higher morbidity and premature deaths), or 
episodically, through famines. But there were also other forces at play. First of all very 
high rates of child mortality, either through systematic infanticide (itself probably a 
function of available resources), especially of females, or as a consequences of neglect 
and of poor living, childbearing, and childrearing conditions. Second, possible neglect of 
the elders, the disabled and the infirm. Third the spread of epidemic diseases (which was 
favoured by overcrowding and poor living conditions in the cities of agricultural 
societies). Then, endemic warfare, between tribes, nations or individuals, leading to 
direct deaths, as well as to misdirection and destruction of the resources otherwise 
                                                 
72 Source of the data of the last column: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at 
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/agggen; the remaining data are taken from Maddison (2006), p. 637. 
73 USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia. 
74 One may be puzzled by the acceleration of the demographic development of Africa in a period of 
massive slave transatlantic trade. The answer seems to lie in the fact that “although some areas of Africa 
were depleted by slave raiding, on balance the African population grew after the establishment of the 
transatlantic slave trade because of new food crops introduced from the New World, particularly 
manioc, corn (maize), and possibly peanuts” (Hellie, 2007). Cf. also Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 198-
199, 311 (p. 199: “The introduction of New World and Asian crops transformed many African 
agricultural societies, enabling them to expand into the vast unpopulated lands of the continent.”); 
Maddison, 2006, p. 569. The demographic consequences of the new crops were somewhat compensated 
however by the spread of new diseases brought by the Europeans (Collins and Burns, pp. 199-200). 
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available for survival.75 Still, following the improvements of agricultural technology in 
particular, there was some population growth at a very slow pace, slightly accelerating in 
time, as shown in table 6.76 Later on, especially since the half of the nineteenth century, 
the decrease in mortality rates (a true “mortality revolution” “which has resulted in 
doubling or more of average life expectancy at birth”77and has been the direct 
consequence of the diffusion of medical knowledge and discoveries that has followed 
with some delay the Industrial Revolution) has led to a much faster population growth, 
while the demographic consequences of two world wars and related upheavals are 
shown in a temporary decrease in growth rates. The post World War II period has seen 
an unprecedented population explosion, with some signs of abating however following 
increasing living standards and progresses in the technology of birth control, spreading 
from the more advanced countries to the lesser developed areas of the world, leading to 
a forecast of about 9.2 billion around the year 2050.78 
What have been the causes of the post World War II world population 
explosion? Essentially the reduction in mortality rates and the increase in life expectancy 
(see the tables in the Statistical Appendix at the end). The birth rate has on the whole 
decreased in the post-war period, but the increase in life expectancy has been stronger; 
17 years between 1950 to 1999 in the world as a whole, more or less the same as in the 
first half of the twentieth century, three times more than the increase of life expectancy 
in the crucial eighty years of the spread of the industrial revolution, from 1820 to 1900. 
One may also note that all the areas of the world have partaken in the great advance in 
life expectancy,79 while the present inequality in average life expectancy between the 
different areas (about 50% between the highest, Western Europe, and the lowest, 
Africa), is much lower than that in wealth or income (see the Statistical Appendix; with 
respect to some other life statistics, however, the picture is more extreme). Moreover, 
“differences in lifetime survival rates between rich and poor countries and between rich 
and poor individuals within countries were much higher two centuries ago than they are 
now”.80 One of the reasons of the population explosion in the post WWII period lies in 
the impact of the Green Revolution in third world countries, such as Mexico and India, 
leading to the strong growth of agricultural production, as well as in the improvements 
                                                 
75 According to Ember (1978) about 60% of the societies of hunter gatherers of which there is 
documentation were recorded to be at war at least once every two years. As to pre-industrial civilizations 
it is enough to recall world and European history (for instance, considering European history 
immediately preceding the Industrial Revolution, in the 16th century 95% of the time there were wars 
involving the major European powers, 94% in the 17th and 78% in the 18th century; cf. Eloranta, 2005). 
For the issue of population control in pre-industrial societies, with a survey  of the relevant literature, see 
Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
76 The relation between population growth and agricultural technology was stressed by Boserup (1965), 
even if in Boserup’s work the causal relation was supposed to act in the contrary sense than the one 
implied above; the crucial element being the density of population affecting the length of fallows. 
However this could be the case if a complete blueprint of alternative agricultural techniques were to exist 
at any given time, not if alternative agricultural techniques had to be discovered, or rediscovered, in a 
lengthy historical process. For a critical assessment of Boserup’s work, see Federico (2001). 
77 Easterlin, 1996, p. 1. 
78 Cf. United Nations, 2006. 
79 Cf. tables 4A and 5A. 
80 Milanovic et alii, 2007, p. 28. 
 - 19 -
in transportation.81 Moreover there was no major demographic catastrophe, of the kind 
that in the old times were blocking demographic advance in a secular perspective.82 (For 
some relevant demographic data we may refer to the statistical appendix at the end.) 
7. Maddison’s statistical summing-up of world economic growth 
Even in the poorest of continents, this means Africa, per capita income has 
strongly increased since the spreading to the whole world of the present mode of 
production that followed the industrial revolution (see Table 7). This has taken place 
notwithstanding the rapid population growth, which in the post World War II years has 
become the highest in the world (2.69% yearly in the period 1973-2001, somewhat 
decreased to 2,36% in the last six years; cf. Table 6).   
According to Maddison’s statistical account (somewhat daring, owing to the 
length of the historical period covered), per capita income has decreased in Western 
Europe during the first 1000 years of our era, from 450PP$ to 400 (where 400 stays for 
the physical subsistence level), reaching a nadir around 600 AD, and then starting a very 
slow recovery.83 In that period the rest of the world fared slightly better, per capita 
incomes being throughout the period somewhat higher in Africa (430 at 1AD, 425 at 
1000AD), and in Asia (450 in both years), while the remaining areas were still at low 
subsistence level (400). Five hundred years later the world as a whole had made some 
modest progress (from 436 to 566). Italy was by far the richest country with 1100PPP$, 
but was stagnating until the Industrial Revolution (1820). The territories that were to 
become the Western Offshoots were the poorest at 400, Africa had somewhat declined 
at 414, stagnating until the colonial conquests of the nineteenth century, China had 
progressed from 450 to 600, staying at that level until 1820 and declining afterwards, 
down to 439 in 1950, Japan also progressed reaching 737 in 1820. At the threshold of 
                                                 
81 With the “Green Revolution” modern agricultural techniques and high productivity seeds were imported 
from the developed world into developing countries through organized efforts spurred first by the 
Rockefeller Foundation (starting from Mexico in 1944), to which the Ford Foundation later joined 
forces. The result was that “the adoption of High Yelding Varieties (HYVs) enormously increased the 
productivity of land and labor” (Federico, 2005, p. 214). For comprehensive statistical data on 
agricultural growth see ibidem, pp. 233 f. 
82 Such as in the case of the Black Death. The only globally relevant demographic catastrophe in the post 
War II period could have been a population deficit of an undetermined (and undeterminable) few tens of 
millions Chinese as a consequence of the famine following Mao’s Great Leap Forward: “a dip in the 
growth rate from 1959-1960… was due to the Great Leap Forward in China. During that time, both 
natural disasters and decreased agricultural output in the wake of massive social reorganization caused 
China's death rate to rise sharply and its fertility rate to fall by almost half” (US Census Bureau, 
18/7/2007; the dip could be graphically seen in the sudden fall in the line of the population growth rate 
reported in the site of the World Population Clock). According to Yao (1999) the demographic deficit in the 
three years 1959-61 was somewhat higher than 49 million, of which about 18.5 million extra deaths and 
the rest lost births. Not a big difference anyway to the size of world population at the time, of about 3 
billion. For other estimates one could refer to the literature quoted by Yao, in particular Peng Xizhe 
(1987). 
83 The data for the year 1 in Western Europe and Asia are considered implausibly low by Federico (2002, 
p. 115). Federico’s viewpoint  is consistent with Milanovic (December 2004) estimate of 840 (p. 22) or 
between 800 and 900 1990 PPP$ (p. 23) as the average per capita income of the Roman empire at the 
times of Augustus. 
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the Industrial Revolution, in 1700, the richest world country were the Netherlands with 
2130, Western Europe was somewhat lower than 1000PPP$ on average.84 
 
 
Table 7. World Per Capita GDP, Regional Averages, 1-2001 AD85 (1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars)86 
 1  1000  1500  1600 1700 1820 1870 1913  1950  1973  2001  
Western Europe  450  400  771  890  998  1 204 1 960 3 458  4 579  11,416 19,256
Eastern Europe  400  400  496  548  606  683  937  1 695  2 111  4 988  6 027  
Former USSR  400  400  499  552  610  688  943  1 488  2 841  6 059  4 626  
Western 
Offshoots 400  400  400  400  476  1 202 2 419 5 233  9 268  16,179 26,943 
Latin America 400  400  416  438  527  692  681  1 481  2 506  4 504  5 811  
Japan  400  425  500  520  570  669  737  1 387  1 921  11,434 20,683 
Asia (excl. Japan)  450  450  572  575  571  577  550  658  634  1 226  3 256  
Africa  430  425  414  422  421  420  500  637  894  1 410  1 489  
World  445  436  566  595  615  667  875  1 525  2 111  4 091  6 049  
 
Economic growth has been accompanied, wherever data are available, by a great 
reduction, in many cases almost a halving, since 1870, of labour time (Maddison, 2006, 
p. 347). And hence by an enormous growth of hourly labour productivity (p. 351). 
Notwithstanding the reduction in labour time, production per worker has greatly 
increased (about ten times since 1870 in Western Europe: Maddison, 2006, p. 349). 
                                                 
84 For the detailed country data one is referred to Maddison (2006, p. 639). 
85 Maddison, 2006, p. 642. 
86 For a definition of Geary-Khamis dollars cf. United Nations, 1992. Perusing the above data it becomes 
obvious that at the time Marx was writing Das Kapital no amount of redistribution could have ever 
brought about the dramatic improvement in the living standards of the masses that technical progress 
and development (“the development of productive forces”) would have brought about in less than a life-
span. Thus Marx (1875) was right in downplaying the issue of distribution as such. Distribution may be 
important in the short-run for allowing some of the worse-off to improve their lot. In the long run for 
the worse off it is more important the relation between distribution, technical improvements, production 
and accumulation. 
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Table 887Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Regions, 0–1998 (annual average compound growth rate)  
 0–1000 1000–1500 1500–1600 1600–1700 1700–1820 1820–1998 
       
Western Europe –0.01 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 1.51 
Western Offshoots 0 0 0 0.17 0.78 1.75 
Japan 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 1.93 
Group A –0.01 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.18 1.67 
       
Latin America 0 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.19 1.22 
Eastern Europe & 
former USSR 0 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.06 
Asia (excluding Japan) 0 0.05 0.01 –0.01 0.01 0.92 
Africa –0.00 –0.01 0 0 0.04 0.67 
Group B –0.00 0.04 0.02 0 0.03 0.95 
World –0.00 0.05 0.05 –0.00 0.05 1.21 
 
 
Table 9.88 Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Region, 1820-2001 (annual average compound growth rate) 
 1820–70 1870–1913 1913–50 1950–73 1973–2001 
Western Europe 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.88 
Eastern Europe 0.63 1.39 0.60 3.81 0.68 
Former USSR 0.63 1.06 1.76 3.35 -0.96 
Western Offshoots 1.41 1.810 01.56 2.45 1.84 
Japan 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14 
Latin America -0.03 1.82 1.43 2.58 1.84 
Asia (excluding Japan) -0.10 0.42 -0.10 2.91 3.55 
Africa 0.35 0.57 0.92 2 0.19 
World 0.54 1.30 0.88 2.92 1.41 
 
 
                                                 
87 Source: Maddison (2006, pp. 30; 643). 
88 Data taken from Maddison (2006, p. 643). 
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8. The very long perspective of the world economic history according to the 
Malthusian viewpoint 
Fig. 1 The Malthusian trap (“world economic history in one picture” ), according to Gregory Clark89  
A possible interpretation of available historical evidence is the Malthusian view. Up to 
the dawn of industrial revolution the great majority of humans were on the brink of 
physical survival. In a very long perspective there was by and large a Malthusian 
equilibrium between population and resources, with a very weak long run growth, 
amounting to near stagnation, of world population.90 Under such circumstances 
distribution of income and wealth affects in the long run the size of the population 
(because unequal distribution uses up resources that could allow a larger population to 
subsist), not the living standards of the masses. At the same time the existence of 
privileged strata, which in the short run at least are somewhat out of the Malthusian trap, 
can affect the well being of the poor through the externalities they generate. These could 
be negative (envy and the sense of relative deprivation) or positive (the hope, however 
slim, to be able to raise among the privileged, some identification with their interest and 
life experience).91 Their relative impact may depend, among others, on the degree of 
                                                 
89 Fig. 1.1 in Clark (2007). 
90 Clark’s 2007 book is a recent representation of this viewpoint. 
91 According to Kenny (2006), and the empirical enquires reported by him, economic and social 
inequalities can have a powerful negative effect on subjective measures of poverty and deprivation, so 
their impact in the past, when they were associated with even greater differences in status and rights than 
in the present times, could have been even more devastating than nowadays. Kenny also underlines the 
negative impact of increasing expectations and new consumer goods on welfare or happiness. But 
happiness is a rather subjective matter, as is well expressed by the Italian poet Metastasio: “Se a ciascun 
l'interno affanno si leggesse in fronte scritto, quanti mai, che invidia fanno, ci farebbero pietà!” As 
economists, we may content ourselves with per capita incomes, but with a lot of caveats, among others 
of the kind argued by Kenny. On happiness and economic growth see also Easterlin, 1996, pp. 131-144. 
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mobility in the society concerned. Religion could surrogate mobility in this world with a 
belief in mobility in the afterworld. Even in the slave society of ancient Rome slaves had 
some degree of hope to be liberated and even to become affluent or, in Christian times, 
to earn after death, alike their rich masters, and ever more than they, the Kingdom of 
Heaven. Moreover the existence of some strata that were able to enjoy a surplus over 
subsistence could have been an engine (however very inefficient) of progress in living 
patterns, and an instrument for providing the resources for some to devote themselves 
to art, technology and science, with eventual long run benefits for average living 
standards, as well as cultural benefits for mankind. Other utilizations of surplus were for 
collective purposes, such as building cathedrals or waging wars, the latter possibly being 
in itself one of the principal instruments, through their disruptive consequences, of 
population control. The working of the limiting factors on the growth of population 
could have affected economic progress negatively, pushing living standards down; 
however greater population density could have lead to more advanced production 
techniques and modes of organization, in particular through the division of labour and 
increasing returns to scale.92 Moreover, even if the Malthusian trap had worked in the 
very long-run, in the shorter run there may have been long periods when population 
growth was compatible with some improvement in average living standards. Thus in the 
shorter run how wealth (land ownership in particular) was distributed could have made a 
great deal of difference for the well being of the bulk of the population. The pressure of 
population on resources could have been reduced by reducing the tendency to 
demographic growth either by decreasing natality or by increasing mortality. Historically 
speaking the increase of mortality and reduction in life expectancy would first of all be 
based on infanticide, but also on high propensity to accidental death in later ages. In 
particular looser centralized political power under pre-agricultural conditions could have 
made life more precarious and insecure, leading to higher adult mortality, and lower 
pressure on resources, thus allowing higher living adult standards than in later more 
densely populated agricultural societies. This could be the reason explaining the paradox 
of the alleged lower living standards in agricultural in relation to hunter-gatherers 
societies.93 
 
9. The take off from the Malthusian Trap, the Industrial Revolution, 
Socialism and Transition 
Thus for almost the totality of human history poverty and starvation have been 
the rule, wealth and affluence a tiny exception in a sea of misery and precarious lives. So 
the real historical singularity that must be explained is not poverty and backwardness, 
but development and wealth. If the issue of relative poverty and underdevelopment 
arises from the economic development of the countries that have become well off rather 
than from some countries having made worse off in an absolute sense, it is to the 
development of poorer countries that one should turn for getting rid of the issue, as well 
as for reducing, and one day perhaps eliminating, absolute poverty. In a number of 
                                                 
92 In the development of agriculture this is stressed by Boserup (1965). 
93 On this see Ember (1978); Diamond (1987); Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
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countries, particularly in Asia, the take-off has succeeded, in others, particularly in Africa, 
seems to have failed. 
The gigantic increase in population and wealth in the last two centuries, and the 
very rapid (historically speaking) decrease in the proportion of the poor have been the 
outcome of a mode of production characterized by the systematic application to 
production of scientific principles, and the systematic and organized pursuit of scientific 
and technological progress, dramatically improving the living prospects of billions of 
men and women, as a consequence of the basic “idea of the world as open to 
transformation by human intervention.”94 According to conventional wisdom its 
ultimate sources may be found in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, tied together 
by the Reformation’s critical discussion of traditional received faith. Until the Soviet 
Revolution this mode of production took the organizational form and vehicle of 
transmission of the internal and international capitalist market.95 Real socialism can be 
seen just a specific variety of this mode of production whereby the fundamental aspects 
have been upheld through a sort of rough extension of the rational organizing principle 
to the whole of society. Eventually this daring experiment has encountered a bitter dead 
end, but in the process it has partaken both of the increase in population and of the 
increase in aggregate production. Its failure has been a comparative failure, but still its 
achievements in aggregate economic and life statistical terms may be seen as substantial 
in relation to pre-industrial epochs. If we are willing to indulge a little bit in 
counterfactuals, suppose that real socialism had prevailed throughout the world by way 
of revolution and/or military conquest, destroying the international market system in the 
process. Probably, after the initial disruptive consequences of the change of system, the 
process of increasing world wealth and population would have persisted anyway. Would 
it have been enough to argue that no better system is possible and to ascribe to the very 
nature of real socialism the economic and demographic outcomes? In this respect two 
viewpoints seem to be equally objectionable: that a really existing, and therefore highly 
imperfect, system of production must be rejected because its performance is seen as 
defective, and another abstractly implementable system (socialism vs. capitalism) should 
do better; as well the opposite contention that no better system of organization (in our 
case capitalism vs. Soviet-type socialism, whenever the latter prevails) is possible.96 A 
further consideration refers to the heavy cost of transition, as borne out in what follows 
by life statistical data. The latter show the heavy cost of revolution (indeed transition in 
the former socialist camp has amounted to a, by and large pacific, but on the whole very 
disruptive, revolution); if compared with the case of China’s transition away from the 
Maoist system, this exemplifies the heavy toll of revolution as compared to evolution. 
                                                 
94 Giddens and Pierson, 1998, p. 94. 
95 This does not detract anything from the role performed by the state, but the basic principle of economic 
functioning was voluntary exchange, and it is on voluntary exchange as made possible by the creation of 
a mercantile economy and the gradual establishment of the rule of law and clear attribution of property 
rights that the success of the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath can be attributed, unlike other 
environments of the past (such as historical China or the Arab world at its apogee) where scientific 
progress and innovations did not translate into sustained economic and technological progress. 
96 Following Demsetz (1969) economists dubb the first of the two views as Nirvana fallacy. 
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10. Post-war development and the Malthusian trap 
As we have already noticed, a most remarkable fact is that the world has never 
grown so fast, as to population and wealth, as in the post World War II period.97 We 
have mentioned the possible causes: globalization (in particular the great intensification 
of international trade and investment), technical progress (and the progress of medicine), 
originating in the European countries and Anglo-European offshoots; in particular 
progress in transportation and agriculture,98 and the absence of devastating conflicts at 
the global level (the world has been on the brink of a nuclear global disaster, but it didn’t 
fall into the precipice, yet). 
Notwithstanding the above success, for the world as a whole the Malthusian trap 
is still lurking. But rather than decreasing agricultural returns, as in the classical 
explanation, it may be here relevant the pressure on scarce natural resources, and in 
particular the retroaction, on development and living standards, of the possible 
“tragedies of the commons”, including climate change.99 The industrial and demographic 
developments that have accompanied the present relative prosperity have taken place at 
the cost of world’s commons, in particular at the cost of the decumulation in the span of 
two hundred years of huge reserves of fossil fuels, the leftovers of hundreds of millions 
of years of life on earth.100 To this one may add the destruction of forests and pristine 
habitats, the pollution or air and water, and, last but not least, CO2 emissions. The 
plunder has mostly taken place to the advantage of industrialized countries, and of 
countries provided with large reserves of raw materials (in particular hydrocarbons), 
appropriating the rents of their exploitation. On the other hand the overall balance for 
poorer and energy poor countries cannot be considered as negative, since in the process 
their average living standards (considering both per capita income and life statistics) have 
greatly improved all the same, as a consequence of the diffusion of the technological 
advances of the West, notwithstanding the colonial domination to which most of them 
had been subjected in the past. But as more and more countries successfully pursue the 
type of industrialization and economic development that has made rich the West and 
better off the emerging economies, the pressure on resources and the enhanced 
generation of externalities may exert a negative feedback elsewhere, especially on the 
living standards of the countries deprived of natural resources, with potential 
destabilizing consequences on the economy and the peace of the world. 
Extrapolating historical experience, the way out the Malthusian trap could lie on 
the one hand in the enhancing of technological progress, and on the other in population 
                                                 
97 This is epitomized by the title of Easterlin 1996 book: Growth Triumphant. 
98 For the remarkable performance of world agriculture in modern times, but especially in the post-second 
world war years, when agricultural output growth was exceeding the most exceptional growth of 
population, see Federico (2005, p. 19). For the role of agriculture spearheading, alongside industry, 
modern economic growth, see Easterlin, 1996, p.5. 
99 According to a plausible view, very specialized life stiles, such as in the contemporary world, increase 
population vulnerability to dramatic environmental changes; see Chu, 1998, pp. 193-194. 
100 In this perspective the long run survival and spreading to the rest of humanity of the high living 
standards of the most developed world crucially depend on the successful untapping of relatively clean 
and plentiful new sources of energy, such as nuclear energy, either in the development of its fission or 
even more, perhaps, in its elusive fusion form. 
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containment, lessening the pressure on the resource base (including world commons). 
Population containment could be the outcome of a voluntary process, either at the 
individual and family level, following the demographic pattern of reduction of natality 
accompanying the development of the presently more developed countries, or it may be 
favoured by public policy; the possible alternatives are the usual ones that have 
constrained the development of population in history. Once demographic developments 
are considered an object of policy, some delicate philosophical problems present 
themselves: Is it better in presence of limited resources to have many overlapping 
generations with short lives, or fewer generations with longer lives? How short or how 
long, and how many generations? How many people for each generation? Many people 
with low living standards, or few ones with higher living standards? And how low or 
how high?101 
11 The limits to population growth: natality, mortality, and catastrophes 
It is obvious that a demographic explosion such as that of the last decades 
cannot last forever. Carlo Cipolla (1974 [1962], p. 86) quotes “an exercise in 
astronomical arithmetics” by C.P. Putnam (the inventor of the first windmill generation 
turbine), according to which “if the [human] race had sprung from a couple living not 
long before agriculture was discovered—let us say 10,000 B.C.—and if its members had 
expanded at the rate of one per cent per year since then [which is lower than the present 
rate of growth of world population], the world population would form today a sphere of 
living flesh many thousand light years in diameter, and expanding with a radial velocity 
that, neglecting relativity, would be many times faster than light.” 
A correction to the process of world overpopulation could be found in a 
decreasing birth rate, as a by-product of per capita income growth, and in the extension 
of social security systems to the countries where the survival of the elderly is otherwise 
dependent on family ties, as well as in the improvement and diffusion of the technology 
of birth control.102 But the progress of medical technology leading to a progressive 
decrease in the mortality rate can have the contrary effect. The shape of a future long-
run population equilibrium, absent a sudden demographic catastrophe, could entail a low 
mortality rate, a low birth rate, a long life span, and a marked increase in the average 
                                                 
101 These dilemmas can be seen as brought to their extreme consequences in Asimov’s utopian world of 
the Foundation series (cf. in particular Asimov, 1986): As an alternative model to the crammed world of 
Trantor, the capital of the Galactic Empire, where 40 billion humans live in artificial domes, we have the 
very sparsely populated Solaria, where the population is controlled by strict demographic planning, with 
few (mutated) humans living very comfortably in very large estates worked by armies of robots. 
102 Thus, according to Easterlin (1996), p. 112, “both theory and evidence indicate that the population 
explosion is a transient phase of contemporary development experience”, since in developing countries 
“the more rapid the Mortality Revolution, the more rapid is the transition to lower fertility”, replicating, 
albeit with different speed and modalities, the demographic transition of present developed countries. 
But can one really discount the possibility that the Mortality Revolution could intensify as a consequence 
of further medical discoveries or that preferences regarding procreation could differ as a consequence of 
different culture in developing countries, or preferences regarding procreation could change even in the 
developed world, altering the dynamic demographic balance? Preferences and science cannot really be 
considered as given in the long-run. 
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population age. Perhaps a senescent population will be less dynamic but wiser.103 While 
we can think of demographic policies affecting the size of a population at the country 
level (even if a country could represent an important part of the world population, such 
as China), it seems hardly possible that demographic policies could be devised and 
implemented at the world level (such as advocated notably by Julian Huxley104) in order 
to take into account the important externalities that individual decisions regarding 
procreation have for the world as a whole.105 In the past demographic control, 
contrasting the operation of the Malthusian trap, was often ensured by custom, involving 
habits such as organized celibacy (such as in monastic orders), repression of sexuality, 
and late marriages (the way out praised by Malthus himself), systematic infanticide, or 
belligerent habits leading to an increase of adult mortality.106 Under conditions of 
progressively increasing life expectancy demographic control could assume the form of 
some limitation to the length of life, if not explicitly and legally binding as in the 
dystopian world of the 10-th Victim,107 in the more subtle form of denying life supporting 
medical treatment and, possibly, the economic means of survival, to the elderly. 
Of the three factors that have historically contributed to held populations in 
check through recurrent catastrophes: epidemic diseases, famines, and war, the impact of 
epidemic diseases has been greatly reduced by the progresses of medicine, and even the 
definitive cure or prevention through vaccination of the AIDS epidemics appears only 
question of time. Of course the possibility of the surfacing of some new epidemic 
disease, such as aviary influenza, is always possible, but only with temporarily limited 
consequences, until, presumably, medical research comes to grip with it. Mass starvation 
as a consequence of famine has been largely overcome by progresses in transportation 
and agricultural technique. Even if at the moment tensions are re-surfacing on the 
international food market, following increased demand and the ill-advised subsidization 
of fuel producing crops, another green revolution is in process through the development 
of OGMs, which, notwithstanding misgivings and preconceived hostilities, seems 
essentially a foregone development. All in all the potentially most destructive factor, 
besides some sudden environmental disaster, could be eventually war, as a consequence 
                                                 
103 And more expert; on the quality advantages of a more aged labour force see Easterlin, 1996, p. 124. For 
the economic consequences of population aging see ibidem, pp. 113, f. 
104 Cf. Julian Huxley (1964). Huxley is rather vague however on the instruments. Apparently the main 
instrument of population control that he envisages is the diffusion and promotion of the technology of 
birth control (p. 248: “When I say a population policy, I don’t mean that anybody is going to tell how 
many children she may have… It means that you recognize population as major problem of national life, 
that you have a general aim in regard to it, and that you try to devise methods for realizing this aim. And 
if you have an international population policy, again it doesn’t mean dictating to backward countries or 
anything of that sort; it means not depriving them of the right … to scientific information on birth-
control, and it means help in regulating and controlling their increase and planning their families.”) 
Fictionally, there is far-reaching demographic planning in Aldous Huxley’s dystopian novel Brave New 
World (1932). 
105 A rather provocative and thought provoking discussion of the externalities generated by individual 
population decisions and the (un)suitability of a deliberate public policy aimed at affecting them is 
Friedman (1972). 
106 For an account of various methods of population control in different historical and anthropological 
contexts, see Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
107 Petri (1965). 
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of the spreading of atomic technology and of international tensions building up in an 
increasingly overcrowded and progressively shrinking world.108  
12. War, peace, the Bomb, and their economic consequences 
Following the tragedy of two world wars the international community refuses in 
principle the model of wars directed to the enlargement of national borders and the 
acquisition of new territories.109 In the post war period these have been very limited: 
Tibet’s conquest by Mao’s China, Timor-Leste’s conquest by Indonesia, Western 
Sahara’s annexation by Morocco, Saddam Hussein’s expansionary wars aimed to acquire 
new territories, in Iran first, and through the annexation of Kuwait later, and the wars of 
Yugoslav succession, renovating the old bloody Balkan wars. On the other hand rather 
than, or perhaps more precisely, in addition to, traditional war dangers, other different 
menaces arise from the conflicts between faiths and ethnicities, partly enhanced and 
conjured by the increased movement of people from the poorer and demographically 
faster growing countries of the South towards the more affluent and demographically 
more stagnant countries of the North. Migrations may lead to an increase in inequality in 
the latter, insofar as migrants are on the whole less skilled than the natives.110 Thus, 
enhanced migratory movements could contribute to increase the inequality inside 
countries in relation to the inequality between countries, reversing the previous historical 
trend in the opposite direction, with destabilizing consequences on the countries 
concerned.  
The spreading of nuclear armaments brings about a reduction in the propensity 
to armed regional conflicts. After India and Pakistan had acquired nuclear status there 
have been moments of acute tension, but, unlike in the past, none of these tensions has 
led to open war. Since it has become a nuclear power, Arab countries have ceased to 
wage open war to Israel. At the same time, in case an open conflict between atomic 
powers were to erupt, the consequences could be disastrous, and not only for the 
countries concerned. In the past the natural productive foundations on which to re-start 
a growth process were largely unaffected by catastrophic events (such as after the Black 
Death), as the foundation of wealth and survival was agriculture. Thus a war of conquest 
had some rationality (as in the present world it could appear to someone a war for 
controlling territories endowed with natural resources, in particular hydrocarbons, or 
having a strategic location for their transport and control). Generally speaking, to 
conquer and enslave rich countries with advanced economies would bring about no 
advantage but disaster: the prosperity of the advanced countries relies on very delicate 
social and economic mechanisms. If they are destroyed, so is prosperity. A much greater 
                                                 
108 It is well known that overcrowding is a factor of aggressiveness in animal populations. Some tendencies 
of this sort could apply to human populations as well, especially if overcrowding leads to tension 
building processes such as massive migration flows and increasing pressure on natural resources and the 
environment. 
109 Waging a war of aggression, in particular, has been made an international crime in the charter of the 
United Nations (art. 39). It is not particularly tranquillizing however that this provision had a precedent 
in article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations but this did not hinder Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union attacking Poland in September 1939, thus triggering the second world war! 
110 With the notable exception of the UK (see Boeri et alii, 2002, p. 24). 
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surplus could be enjoyed through voluntary exchange than through conquest and 
enslavement.111 The game humanity played in the past, when conquest, plunder, 
territorial expansion and domination, slavery, torture and mass killings were respectable 
endeavours and part of the rules of the game, and mass murderers acquired the status of 
national heroes, still remembered and glorified in monuments and history books, led on 
the whole to very poor results, as measured at least in terms of demographic and 
economic growth.112 As we have seen, until recent times the progress of humanity, both 
in terms of population and of productive achievements, was so slow as to amount, in 
our present perception of time, more to stagnation than to growth, with long spans of 
regression. The first millennium of the vulgar era was for Europe a lost millennium: the 
decadence and fall of the Roman Empire and the dislocations following the barbaric 
invasions left Europe worse off economically in the year 1000, at the dawn of the new 
Christian nations, than at the time of the birth of Jesus Christ, with the bottom reached 
around 600. Real sustained progress, meaning a substantial overcoming of the 
Malthusian trap (or anyway, whatever the interpretation, of the near stagnation in world 
population and economy), had to wait until the Industrial Revolution gradually spread all 
over the world. But it has been the peace period after the Second World War (localized 
conflicts notwithstanding) that has led to the greatest acceleration in the speed of 
demographic and economic advance the world has ever known in its history. In the 
present world the victory in a nuclear war would be a Pyrrhic one, since conquered 
territories would stay contaminated and unproductive for the foreseeable future, 113 and 
the wealth of the defeated would be destroyed with their physical destruction, not to 
speak of the losses of the victor. Until now this entirely rational consideration (as well as 
the fear for the enormous losses of a nuclear war) has prevented wars between nuclear 
powers. But with the spreading of nuclear technology, together with irrationality and 
fanaticism, and the tensions originating from the possible increasing scarcity of basic 
resources, such as fossil fuels or water, how much will this interval of relative, and 
relatively affluent, tranquillity last? Carlo Cipolla’s words in the concluding page of his 
Economic History of World Population (1974 [1962], p. 133) still continue to be of great 
relevance, no less than at the time they were written: 
“There is nothing more dangerous than technical knowledge when 
unaccompanied by respect for human life and human values. The introduction of 
modern techniques in environments that are still dominated by intolerance and 
aggressiveness is a most alarming development…Ethical progress has to accompany 
technical and economic development. While teaching techniques, we have to teach also 
respect for the dignity and worth and indeed the sanctity of human personality.”  
                                                 
111 This was the point raised by Angell (1913, p. ix) on the eve of the First World War (“it is impossible for 
one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another -- to enrich itself by subjugating, or imposing 
its will by force on another”); rational economic considerations however do not appear to have had then 
much of an impact on what is an eminent destructive endeavour, as they may not have, unfortunately, in 
the future. Moreover “not the facts, but men’s belief about facts, shapes their conduct” (ibidem). 
112 For a quantitative assessment of the negative impact of war on growth in modern times, see Milanovic 
(2005). 
113 But the above does not apply to the neutron bomb! 
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But to teach how? The solution to invade “rogue” countries that house 
dangerous territorial expansion programmes, with the declared purpose of  spreading  
democracy and human rights (conforming to the German and Japanese model of post-
war occupation and re-education) does not seem to have attained the declared 
objective.114 Even more, it has apparently disturbed wasps’ nests of archaic barbarism 
and created dangerous precedents. Moreover the credential of the West as a teacher of 
“respect of human life and human values” are rather poor. Only in the last 60 years or so 
of its very long history has the West unanimously repudiated the wars of conquest that 
in the past were one of the most popular endeavours of its nations and its rulers. The 
wars of the last century (in particular the last world war) have been triggered, to its 
extreme consequences, by a tradition of humanity according which war and conquest 
were a source of glory and pride. Now that the game with us is over we want to persuade 
the others to give up the game themselves. But the success of such an effort of 
persuasion and assimilation to the recently found western values of peace and toleration 
(that has been apparently quite successful in the case of post-war Japan) is vital both for 
the rest of mankind and for the West alike, owing to the destructive power of modern 
nuclear warfare, and the fact that the West will soon be unable, in face of the growth of 
the economic and military potential of the Rest (or rather of a subset of it, first of all 
China), to maintain its economic and military dominance so as to keep in check 
adventurous expansionist new (or old) powers. According to past experience any time 
new international actors raise forcefully on the scene of international politics following 
successful economic growth, some violent adjustments of the power relations are on the 
agenda.115 But presently the consequences of large scale armed conflicts would be 
potentially highly destructive.  
13. Dangers for the future 
But persuasion and assimilation will not necessarily succeed. Traditional power 
politics and dangerous breakmanship may resurface again in a world where the West will 
have lost its primacy. Sooner or later we may go back to normality, with nationalism 
breeding imperialism and wars of aggression, but with much enhanced capabilities for 
destruction. Large scale nuclear warfare could always be a possibility, especially with the 
inevitable proliferation of nuclear capabilities, with enormous risks for the survival of 
humanity, even short of Dr. Strangelove’s Doomsday Machine. Our world has always 
been a very dangerous place, and eventually it will be quite unsuitable for human 
survival, and, more broadly, for animal survival, anyway. In the meantime, after the 
possible demise of mankind and before the end of the Earth, the radioactive left-over of 
global nuclear warfare could, by favouring mutations, engender the creation of many 
other strange living species, and the human race may be recalled just as a particularly 
weird specimen, among the many bizarre animal species that have populated the earth, 
perhaps the only one so vain to harbour the very strange egocentric-anthropocentric 
thought that the earth, and the whole universe, were created just for its own benefit. 
                                                 
114 For some arguments in favour of active military intervention, at least in the case of failed states, see 
however Collier, 2007b. 
115 Cf. Easterlin, 1996, p. 6 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX: LIFE STATISTICS 
Table 1A116 Yearly births per 100 population 
 1820 1900 1950 1999 2007 
Italy 3.9 3.3 1.94  0.93 0.85 
West European Average 3.74 3.08 1.83 1 1(EU) 
East European Average     0.99117 
United States 5.52 3.23 2.4 1.44 1.42 
Japan 2.62 3.24 2.81 0.95 0.81 
Russia 4.13 4.8 2.65 0.88 1.09 
Latin American Average   4.19 2.51  
China  4.12 3.7 1.6 1.75 
India  4.58 4.5 2.8 2.27 
Asian Average (without Japan)   4.28 2.3  
African Average   4.92 3.9 3.8 
World   3.74 2.3 2.02 
 
Table 2A. Average Life Expectancy for Groups A and B, 1000–1999118 (years at birth; average for both sexes) 
 1000  1820  1900  1950  1999 
Group A  24  36  46  66  78 
Group B  24  24  26  44  64 
World  24  26  31  49  66 
 
                                                 
116 Source: Maddison, p. 32 (some of the values refer to slightly different years: see the notes in the source); 
for the year 2007: CIA (2007), and, for the African average, PRB (2007). The data reported in the World 
Factbook for 2007 range from 0.73 (Hong-Kong) to 5.0. It is notable that among the 223 countries 
whose data are reported, 9 of the first 10 positions belong to African countries.  
117 Simple average of 17 East-European countries, with values ranging from 8.8 (Bosnia) to 1.2 
(Macedonia). 
118 Source: Maddison, p. 33. Group A: Western Europe, Western Offshoots (USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand), and Japan, Group B is the rest of the world. 
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Table 3A.119 Life expectancy at birth 
 1820 1900 1950 2007 
Italy 30 43 66 79.9 
Western Europe 36 46 67 79.5 
Eastern Europe    74.5 
Russia 28 32 65 65.9 
United States 39 47 68 78 
Japan 34 44 61 82 
Latin America 27 35 51 72.8 
China na 24 41 72,9 
India 21 24 32 68.6 
Asia 23 24 40 69 
Africa 23 24 38 52,2 
World 26 31 49 65.8 
More developed 
countries 
   76.7 
Less developed 
countries 
   64.6 
Sources: Maddison, 2006, p. 32; for 2007 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/ipc/idbagg. 
                                                 
119 In order to understand the implication of the data one should consider that the data concerning life 
expectancy are affected for pre-modern and modern backward societies by very high child mortality 
rates, while adult life expectancy can be much higher. For instance in a demographic regime such as in 
the Mopti district of Mali in 1957-58 with a total fertility rate (average number of live birth per woman) 
of 7.5, life expectancy was 18, but life expectancy at 20 was 48, while in another one, corresponding 
more or less to the demographic regime of 1650-1750 England, with fertility rate 4 life expectancy was 
33, but life expectancy at 20 was 55 (Caldwell and Caldwell, 2003, p.  210). 
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 Table 4A. Some life statistics from WHO, year 2005120 
 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate121 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate122 
Infant 
mortality 
rate123 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate124 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate125 
 male female male female male female     
Italy 78 84 71 75 89 46 4 4 3 5 
USA 75 80 67 71 137 81 8 7 4 14 
Japan 79 86 72 78 92 45 4 3 1 10 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
India 62 64 53 54 280 207 74 56 39 540 
Brazil 68 75 57 62 225 118 33 28 13 260 
China 71 74 63 65 155 98 27 23 18 56 
South-
East 
Asian 
Region 
62 65 54 55 272 207 68 51 35 460 
African 
Region 
48 50 40 42 480 438 165 99 40 910 
World 64 68 56 59 233 164 74 51 28 400 
European 
Union126 
76 82      5   
Some interesting extreme values (giving the existing range), from CIA Factbook (2007): Birth rate 
(births/1000) 50 (Niger)--7,34 (Hong-Kong); death rate (deaths/1000): 30.35 (Swaziland127)--2.16 (United 
Arab Emirates); Infant Mortality Rate: 184.84 (Angola)--2.3 (Singapore); Life Expectancy at Birth: 83.52 
(Andorra)--32.23 (Swaziland); Total Fertility Rate (children born/woman): 7.38 (Mali)---0.98 (Hong-Kong) 
(1.50 EU). 
 
                                                 
120 WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in their assessment, see 
WHO, National Burden of Disease Studies:A Practical Guide. Geneva; WHO, 2001. 
121 Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
122 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
123 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
124  Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
125 Per 100,000 live births. 
126 From CIA (2007). 
127 In the case of Swaziland the very high mortality rate and the the very low life expectancy can be related 
to a HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of nearly 40% (cf. CIA Factbook , 2007).. 
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Table 5A. Some life statistics of Eastern Europe from WHO, year 2005128 
 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate129 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate130 
Infant 
mortality 
rate131 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate132 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate133 
 male female male female male female     
Albania 69 73 59 63 167 98 18 16 9 55 
Belarus 63 75 57 65 366 133 9 7 3 36 
Bosnia 70 77 62 66 186 88 15 13 10 31 
Bulgaria 69 76 63 67 213 92 15 12 7 32 
Croatia 72 79 64 69 166 65 7 6 5 10 
Czech Rep 73 79 66 71 156 70 4 3 2 9 
Estonia 67 78 59 69 281 100 7 6 4 38 
Hungary 69 77 62 68 256 107 8 6 5 11 
Latvia 65 76 58 68 314 114 10 8 6 61 
Lithuania 65 77 59 68 326 109 9 7 5 19 
Poland134 71 79 63 68 208 79 8 6 5 10 
Romania 68 76 61 65 230 102 19 16 10 58 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
Serbia 70 75 … … 192 98 9 8 … … 
Slovakia 70 78 63 69 201 77 9 7 4 10 
Slovenia 74 81 67 72 152 67 4 3 2 17 
Ukraine 61 73 55 64 403 150 17 13 7 38 
 
                                                 
128 World Health Statistics, WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in 
their assessment, see WHO, 2001. 
129 Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
130 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
131 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
132  Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
133 Per 100,000 live births. 
134 From CIA (2007). 
